|
||||||||||
|
Defending William James' Argument in "The Will to Believe" Pragmatism - April 2004 The purpose of this paper is to explicate the argument put forth by pragmatist William James in The Will to Believe. This will be followed by what possible criticisms pragmatist Charles Peirce may have against James’ argument. The validity of Peirce's criticism will then be evaluated in defense of William James' argument.In The Will to Believe, William James makes a provocative claim that invokes the criticism of philosophers of the empiricist persuasion. Within empiricist circles, it has always been taken for granted that in order to rationally believe in a proposition, that proposition must be backed by evidence. This outlook came to be known as evidentialism. For example, it was taken as a basic principle that in order to believe that God exists, the believer has some sort of burden to provide evidence for the existence of such a cosmic entity. People who accepted propositions without sufficient evidence were looked down upon as dogmatic or wishful thinkers. James’ article challenges evidentialism by analyzing the motivations underlying the acceptance of a belief. James notes two motivations that get people to develop beliefs: fear of error and yield to hope. James attributes the first motivation to the evidentialist camp. The evidentialists are very fearful to believe in something that would eventually turn out to be false. This fear is the cause of their strong-willed insistence that one should withhold belief about something until sufficient evidence is mounted for or against that proposition. The second motivation to yield to hope is held by people who are not afraid to commit themselves to beliefs that may turn out to be false one day. People within this circle see more value in deriving hope from a belief than worrying about the possibility that their belief might be false. James strikes a criticism to the evidentialists by pointing out some sort of special pleading on their part. The evidentialists are so hung up on their requirement for evidence, yet they fail to realize that the choice between the two motivations for accepting belief is not a choice that is itself based on evidence. When choosing to be motivated by the fear of error or the yield to hope, one does not look at a set of evidences to determine which motivation is more rational. James argues that the choice between these two motivations is wholly based on a person’s passions and aesthetic preferences. Let us go back to the earlier example of the existence of God. As noted above, the evidentialist insistently requires evidence for accepting this belief. The person who yields to hope, on the other hand, would accept the existence of God in the absence of evidence for such a belief. James argues that the person who yields to hope has just as much epistemic right to believe in God as the evidentialist has in refraining from such a belief. The reason is that the decision to either withhold belief because of the fear of error or to yield to a belief for hope is not a decision that is based on evidence. Thus, the person who believes in God without evidence is just as rational as the person who remains agnostic as he or she waits for evidence. Now it is important to note that James does not endorse willing to believe just any proposition without evidence. A belief must be of a special type to be considered something worthy of acceptance without evidence. James calls this a genuine belief. He puts forth three characteristics of this type of belief:
Peirce indicates in his writing that he desires to attain knowledge of the world that is ultimately independent of human minds. Peirce holds a desire for some sort of objectivity in our attempts to gain knowledge of the world. This is the reason why Peirce argues for the method of inquiry that would achieve this objectivity he desires. Peirce considers four methods of inquiry:
Returning to the earlier discussion of James’ Will to Believe, the fact that he allows for passions and aesthetic preferences in accepting some beliefs negates the whole purpose of the method of science. The method of science is meant to be conducted independent of the passions of the human mind. The human mind is bombarded with biases and prejudices that can skew scientific discoveries. These biases and prejudices tremendously influence our passions and aesthetic preferences. Thus, to give in to these passions and aesthetic preferences is to render oneself a victim of the biases and prejudices that would skew scientific studies. This, for Peirce, would be to miss the boat of objectivity and drown in the sea of subjectivity. It is also objectionable to Peirce that the passions and aesthetic preferences James allows are not subject to verification. Verification is important in that it “socializes” the validity of a belief. Verification allows more people to witness he veridicality of a belief. The existence of God that James defends is not something that can be subjected to empirical verification. The popular notion of God is that of an immaterial personal agent. This means that God cannot be perceived by the five physical senses. Therefore, no empirical test can ever support or discredit the veridicality of God’s existence. The method of science can never be used to investigate this issue. The lack of verification in this case limits this belief to the individual. The belief is not social, and Peirce sees this as a major shortcoming. Peirce insistence on verification can lead us to question whether he would even render beliefs without evidence as meaningful. According to the operationalist theory of meaning Peirce holds, a proposition is made meaningful by the experiments performed on that proposition. Take the notion of hardness as an example. Experiments can be performed to determine the hardness of an object. After experimental verification of the hardness of an object, one can say the following:
It would be very interesting to speculate on how William James would respond to Peirce’s criticisms. His points on The Will to Believe, however, might have done a good job responding to these criticisms. It would seem that James could rightly label Peirce an evidentialist. Peirce is very concerned about the effects of biases and prejudices on the human mind. The reliance on the human mind alone would lead to subjective speculations according to Peirce. That is why Peirce insists on the use of the method of science. This is really not an issue for James. James would never argue against the use of science to discover things about the world. As a matter of fact, James was a doctor and an anatomist who exercised the method of science regularly. James’ point in The Will to Believe is much more profound. He argues that the nature of the existence of God is such that it is not open to scientific investigation. The question cannot be settled using the method of science. God’s immateriality disqualifies it from empirical investigation. So the bigger question in this matter is whether one ought to refrain from belief due to the fear of error or to go ahead and yield to hope with the belief that there is a God. James can say that Peirce chooses the former, and this choice is wholly arbitrary. Peirce holds not a single evidence to support his choice to refrain from belief. To be clear, Peirce was a theist, but he would never claim that his belief in God is in anyway rational according to his view of rationality. James’ claim in The Will to Believe is much bolder. James claimed that he is just as rational in his belief in God as the scientists and philosophers who ridicule this belief. |
||||||||||
|
||||||||||